OLD REGULATORY WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE OF
TECHNOLOGY—— A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S
SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM
Bi Honghai†
In 2014, the Chinese government launched a comprehensive
“Outline for the Construction of Social Credit System” (hereinafter
“OCSCS”) and plans to build a credit reporting system covering the
whole society by 2020.1 The two key elements of this Chinese social
credit system are the keeping, sharing, and evaluating of credit
records and various incentive mechanisms, which include rewards
and punishments.2 In order to advance this system, two agencies of
the central government, the National Development and Reform
Commission and the People’s Bank of China, have organized modelbuilding pilot programs in 43 cities and urban areas nationwide since
2015, covering governments of sub-provincial cities, prefecture-level
cities, county-level cities, and districts of cities. By the beginning of
2018, a list of 12 model cities for social credit system engineering
was identified and publicized. 3 Since then, this system has been
†
Hong-Hai Bi, S.J.D. (毕洪海博士) is an associate professor at Beihang
University Law School. My many thanks go to Ziming Dong, Philip Girard,
Benjamin Liebman, Neysun Maboubi, Amanda Morrison and Ling Yang and
those who participated in my lecture on this topic at Columbia Law School. I
would also like to thank the editors of the Asian Law Review for their efforts
devoted to this article. All errors are mine. The author could be reached at
bihonghai@buaa.edu.cn.
1
Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Guihua Gangyao (2014–2020) (社会信用体
系建设规划纲要 (2014–2020)) [State Council Notice Concerning Issuance of
the Planning Outline for the Establishment of a Social Credit System (2014–
2020)], GUOFA [2014] No. 21, June 27, 2014,
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm
[https://perma.cc/UW63-Y4S7] (China). For English translation, see Planning
Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020),
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-forthe-construction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/ [https://perma.cc/6C2EF253].
2
Id. at §§ IV, V.
3
These 12 cities are Hangzhou, Nanjing, Xiamen, Chengdu, Suzhou,
Suqian, Huizhou, Wenzhou, Weihai, Weifang, Yiwu, and Rongcheng. An
introduction to the experiences of these cities is available at
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expanded nationwide, local regulations and rules have been enacted,
and more have been drafted and published for comment in various
provinces. Some of the essential documents are available in English,
though not the official versions.4
The social credit system has attracted great attention inside
and outside China, but for quite different reasons. The most
important concern in the countries outside of China is the union of an
authoritarian regime and information technology, which means the
system could be used to further monitor society, leading to an
Orwellian State, or at least to the eve of 1984.5 In the American
context, China’s social credit system is easily reminiscent of the
dystopian TV series Black Mirror (“Nosedive,” episode one of the
third season). This kind of concern leads to many criticisms of
China’s social credit system based on futuristic visions rather than the
existing implementation. Of course, such privacy concerns due to
technology-centralism and big data-driven algorithm governance also
exist in the United States, such as the NSA’s monitoring of citizen
communications as revealed by Edward Snowden and
Facebook/Cambridge Analytica’s notorious use of personal
information. The use of new technologies for surveillance and data
analysis has triggered a form of criticism called “Turnkey
Totalitarianism.”6 In contrast, it is reported that the support of the
Chinese people for this system is rather high.7 It is worth noting that
the current social credit system in China is far from the scene depicted

http://www.creditchina.gov.cn/chengxinwenhua/chengshichengxinwenhua/
[https://perma.cc/VJ6E-95H9].
4
See generally Legal Documents Related to the Social Credit System, CHINA
L. TRANSLATE, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/social-credit-documents/
[https://perma.cc/DZT2-FU24] (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).
5
Celia Hatton, China ‘Social Credit’: Beijing Sets Up Huge System, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34592186
[https://perma.cc?FX6U-26XU]; Big Data, Meet Big Brother: China Invents the
Digital Totalitarian State, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 17, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/12/17/china-invents-the-digitaltotalitarian-state/ [https://perma.cc/H5B9-W63H].
6
Rick Perlstein, He’s Making A List: Trump Is More Paranoid and
Dangerous Than Nixon, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 2, 2017),
https://newrepublic.com/article/138911/hes-making-list-trump-paranoiddangerous-nixon/ [https://perma.cc/RPB5-HWDU].
7
Genia Kostka, China’s Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion:
Explaining High Levels of Approval, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1, 11–12 (2019).
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by Black Mirror,8 and the Chinese have quite high expectations for
what the system can achieve in the context of regulation.
It is precisely confusing the future with reality that has led to
some misplaced criticism. In order to clarify the true meaning of the
social credit system, this paper first describes the general context and
content of the social credit system being built in China. It then
distinguishes the two kinds of social credit: market credit and public
credit. The confusion between the two kinds of social credit is at the
root of some misplaced criticism. This paper further divides the
social credit system into a two-level structure: one is technical, the
other is regulatory. It is more accurate to describe China’s current
social credit system as old wine in a new bottle. The old wine refers
to the regulatory level, namely the social credit system is just another
kind of “mundane regulatory law,” 9 used to solve some persistent
problems. It is more like a background investigation during the
process of public decision-making, similar to the workings of market
credit, which will check the financial capacities and economic
activities of the credit subject. The new bottle refers to the
technological level, namely the recent developments of IT that have
made social credit engineering much easier. The technology itself
has given rise to many concerns that need to be addressed. However,
this paper argues that although it may be unremarkable as a regulatory
measure, changes in technology have given new content to the
regulatory side of the social credit system and created new legal
problems that need to be dealt with.
The paper is divided into four parts. The first part outlines the
background and content of China’s current social credit system. It
shows that China’s current social credit engineering is mainly about
public credit. What the system is trying to solve is the lack of
8
Jamie P. Horsley, China’s Orwellian Social Credit Score Isn’t Real,
BROOKINGS (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2018/11/19/chinas-orwellian-social-credit-score-isnt-real/
[https://perma.cc/X7R3-G4TJ]; Jeremy Baum, Social Credit Overview Podcast,
CHINA L. TRANSLATE (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/social-credit-overview-podcast/?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/7FMD-526C]; Bing Song, The West May Be Wrong About
China’s Social Credit System, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/11/29/socialcredit/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b180962e00b3 [https://perma.cc/BHV6UKSR].
9
Baum, supra note 8.
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integrity (trust) in Chinese society. The second part analyzes the
structure of the social credit system from two levels, technical and
regulatory. The technical level of social credit system covers the
whole process from input of credit information (data collection) to
output of credit evaluation (social credit grades and black lists). The
regulatory level of social credit engineering refers to the legal
implications of credit evaluation. Based on the local practices across
China, different models of data collection and social credit grades
have different legal implications. The first level of this structure can
be extended one step backward to include the infrastructure of the
social credit system, and one step forward to include publicity and
repair of social credit. The third part of the paper discusses the
problems and solutions of the technical level, points out the problems
with data collection and algorithms, and argues that the potential of
reconstructing citizens’ “status” based on social credit grades poses
serious challenges with respect to human dignity. The fourth part
discusses problems with the social credit system as a means of
regulation in and of itself due to the technological change.

I. ORIGINS AND A NEW STARTING POINT: THE
BACKGROUND AND CONTENT OF THE SOCIAL CREDIT
SYSTEM
As far as the formal institution is concerned, the Chinese
government’s attention to social credit began as early as the turn of
the new century. Social credit at this point was mainly understood as
market credit, the end of which was to ensure the security of
economic transactions. 10
However, since 2011–2012, the
understanding of social credit in the official documents and the
discourse has undergone a dramatic change. 11 The social credit
10

Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe de Ruogan
Yijian Guobanfa (2007) No.17 (国务院办公厅关于社会信用体系建设的若干意
见国办发〔2007〕17 号) [2007 Several Opinions of The General Office of The
State Council on The Construction of The Social Credit System No.17]
(promulgated by St. Council, Mar. 23, 2007, effective Mar. 28, 2008), ST. COUNCIL
GAZ., Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-04/02/content_569314.htm
[https://perma.cc/3H98-NWHZ] (China).
11
The Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee proposed
the four major areas of the social credit system for the first time, and the Report of
the 18th National Congress inherited this formulation and continued to be the
planning outline for 2014. Hu Jintao zai Zhongguo Guochandang di Shibai ci
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system has been developed to address doubts in integrity and mistrust
in society at large. Since 2012, the social credit system has been
regarded as an important form of social governance innovation.12 It
is also considered the embodiment of socialist core values at the
institutional level and has been incorporated into legislative planning,
with the goal of strengthening civil morality.13 By the end of 2020,
at least 35 statutes and 42 administrative regulations have clauses
related to the social credit system and the draft of Social Credit Law
has been formulated. 14 Alongside institutionalization, the social
credit system has multiplied the amount of data gathered and has
become a rather comprehensive regulatory mechanism.
1. Returning to the Origin of Integrity
In the view of Chinese scholars, the credit system of the
Western countries (sometimes also referred to as social credit) is
mainly about economic transactions and financial activities.15 The
Quanguo Daibiao Dahui shang de Baogao (胡锦涛在中国共产党第十八次全国
代表大会上的报告) [Hu Jintao’s Report at the 18th National Congress of The
Communist Party of China], XINHUA NEWS,
http://www.xinhuanet.com//18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_113711665_7.htm
[perma.cc/Z6MA-9NLB] (explaining that the overall improvement of citizens’
morality included strengthening government integrity, business integrity, social
integrity, and the construction of judicial credibility).
12
Jiang Bixin(江必新), Yi Dang de Shijiuda Jingshen wei Zhidao, Jiaqiang
he Chuangxin Shehui Zhili (以党的十九大精神为指导，加强和创新社会治理)
[Strengthen and Innovate Social Governance guided by the 19th CPC National
Congress], 1 J. CHINESE ACAD. GOVERNANCE 23–29, 26 (2018).
13
Zhonggong Zhongyang Yinfa Shehuizhuyi Hexin Jiazhiguan Rongru Fazhi
Jianshe Lifa Xiufa Guihua (中共中央印发《社会主义核心价值观融入法治建
设立法修法规划》) [The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
Planning of The Integration of Socialist Core Values into The Enactment and
Amendment of Legislation in The Construction of Rule of Law], XINHUA NEWS
(May 7, 2018),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-05/07/c_1122796215.htm [perma.cc/4S8J9PE4].
14
Guojia Fazhang Gaige Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Zhaokai Shehuixinyong Lifa
Zhuanti Yantaohui (国家发展改革委组织召开社会信用立法专题研讨会) [The
National Development and Reform Commission organized seminars on social
credit legislation], CREDIT CHINA (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/home/lfdt/202012/t20201215_220505.html
[https://perma.cc/KB69-5DKV].
15
When Chinese scholars introduce the social credit systems from the other
countries, they usually refer to the credit systems in the economic and financial
fields. For example, Zhao Rui (赵锐), Woguo Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe de
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essence of this system is risk management of transactions, in contrast
to social integrity or social trust, which are solved by the
establishment of legal and moral mechanisms. 16 In addition to
market credit, China’s social credit system addresses the lack of
integrity in a rapidly transforming society. As a result, though it
includes the term “credit,” this system is not based on economic credit
as understood in western countries. Rather, China’s social credit is
derived from integrity, reputation,17 and trust,18 the scope of which
goes far beyond market credit.
Historically, integrity has always been regarded as a core
component of traditional Chinese culture. “Integrity” is one of the
“five virtues” of the individuals in the doctrines of Confucianism.
There is a maxim in “The Analects:” “If a man does not keep his word,
what is he good for?” In interpersonal communication: “a promise is
worth a thousand ounces of gold.” In business, a common phrase
assures: “we are equally honest even with children and aged
customers.” Even in the agricultural society of pre-modern China,
merchants, who were at the bottom of the four estates (“scholar,
farmer, artisan, and merchant”), were associated with the reputation
“no fraud, no business.” In the process of transforming from an
agricultural society to an industrial and post-industrial society—and
also from a society of acquaintances to a society of strangers—the
creation of a social credit system is seen not only as a form of
insurance for economic transactions, but also as an integral element
to restore integrity into China’s cultural fabric. In this regard, social
credit in the context of contemporary China includes the two essential
Tantao—Pouxi Jiejian Deguo SCHUFA de Shehui Xinyong Tixi (我国社会信用
体系建设的探讨—剖析、借鉴德国 SCHUFA 的社会信用体系) [Discussion on
the Construction of China’s Social Credit System—Analysis and Reference to the
Social Credit System of SCHUFA in Germany], 4 E-GOVERNMENT 84, 84–93
(2017); Dong Caisheng (董才生), Meiguo Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe de
Jingyan Jiaoxun dui Woguo de Qishi (美国社会信用体系建设的经验教训对我
国的启示) [Experiences and Lessons for China Revelation from the American
Social Credit System], 17 NORTHEAST ASIA F. 39, 39–42(2008).
16
Han Jiaping (韩家平), Zhongguo Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe de Tedian
yu Qushi Fenxi (中国社会信用体系建设的特点与趋势分析) [Analysis of the
Characteristics and Trends of China’s Social Credit System Construction], 5
CREDIT REF. 1, 1–5 (2018).
17
Xin Dai, Toward a Reputation State: The Social Credit System Project of
China 5–7 (June 10, 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3193577
[http://perma.cc/WU7Q-BTRN].
18
Yu-Jie Chen et al., “Rule of Trust:” The Power and Perils of China’s
Social Credit Megaproject, 32 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 2–3 (2018).
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meanings of “integrity:” the first is honesty, which means seeking
truth from facts and not deceiving; the second is keeping promises.
These two aspects are the basic requirements of a trust-based society,
including but not limited to activities in the market.19
2. Lack of Integrity: Transition from a Society of Acquaintances to
One of Strangers
Integrity within an acquaintance-based society rests on known
personal character. There are consequences when an individual is
dishonest, such as a tarnished reputation that affects the
neighborhood relationships. The transition from a society of
acquaintances to a society of strangers calls for a new way of
determining the trustworthiness of its members, namely through seals
of approval. 20 Over the years, these mechanisms have included
contracts in the industrial age, digital systems in the information
age, 21 and now distributed ledger technologies such as blockchain
and smart contracts, which are used as potential transaction
guarantees in an ever more anonymous internet world.
When social credit was first proposed in China, it was mainly
to address economic concerns. As early as the 1980s, the principle
of integrity was enshrined in the General Principles of Civil Law.22
Later on, social credit was mainly used to address problems of stateowned enterprises unable to repay their loans and small businesses
unable to obtain loans from banks. Therefore, even before entering
the 21st century, China had accelerated the construction of a credit
reporting system.23 In 1997 and 1999, the People’s Bank of China
19

Zhang Yaguang (张亚光), Jindai Xinyong Jianguan Tixi de Sixiang Zhidu
yu Jingyan Qishi (张亚光) [Ideological System and Experience Enlightenment of
Modern Credit Supervision System], http://www.aisixiang.com/data/110618.html
[perma.cc/9JT6-LD3M].
20
Jeremy Shearmur & Daniel B. Klein, Good Conduct in the Great Society:
Adam Smith and the Role of Reputation, in REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE
VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT 29–45 (Daniel B. Klein eds., Univ.
of Michigan Press 1997).
21
Han, supra note 16, at 5.
22
Article 4 reads: “In civil activities, the principles of voluntariness, fairness,
making compensation for equal value, honesty and credibility shall be observed.”
General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, (promulgated
by Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) (Lawinfochina).
23
In 2001, the Economic and Trade Commission of State Council jointly
issued the “Notice on Strengthening the Credit Management of SMEs” with 10
ministries and commissions.
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launched the basic databases of corporate credit reporting and
personal credit reporting. The two databases have been online for
reference since 2006. 24 Government agencies also announced a
series of “blacklists,” including a list of discredited companies that
failed to pay their debts. The theoretical presumption during this
period was that the market economy was based on a credit economy,
thus the major concern was financial creditworthiness, with the goal
of safeguarding economic transactions, expanding the market, and
reducing transaction costs.25
However, with rapid economic development and social
transformation, social credit in China has expanded its scope to
embrace every aspects of the social life.26 The OCSCS now describes
the social credit system as helping to prevent: “grave production
safety accidents, food and drug security incidents . . . commercial
swindles, production and sales of counterfeit products, tax evasion,
fraudulent financial claims, academic impropriety and other such
phenomena [that] cannot be stopped in spite of repeated bans.” 27
According to the OCSCS, lack of integrity is not only a problem of
personal virtue, but also a problem of social governance; the general
level of integrity should be enhanced not only through education, but
also through the authority and effectiveness of the regime itself.
Therefore, China’s social credit engineering has greater ambitions.
Besides market credit, the most important aspect of the system is
obeying laws and rules and keeping promises. At the same time,
government integrity and judicial credibility is a function of
24
Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Zhengxin Zhongxin (中国人民银行征信中
心) [CREDIT REFERENCE CENTER], THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA,
https://ipcrs.pbccrc.org.cn/ [https://perma.cc/63FM-JRRU].
25
Lin Yifu (林毅夫), Jianli Quanguo Tongyi de Shehui Xinyong Tixi (中国
人民银行征信中心) [Establish A National Unified Social Credit System],
RENMINWANG (人民网) [PEOPLE.COM] (Mar. 7, 2002, 4:09 PM),
http://www1.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/7501/7506/20020307/681866.html
[perma.cc/NT4J-HYYG].
26
Ouyang Haiyan (中国人民银行征信中心), 2011 Zhongguoren Xinyong
Da Diaocha: Chengxin Weiji Citong Zhongguo (中国人民银行征信中心) [2011
Chinese People’s Credit Survey: Integrity Crisis Stings China], in 8 XIAO KANG
INDEX OF CHINESE CREDIT (中国信用小康指数) 48–52 (2011).
27
Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Guihua Gangyao (2014–2020) (社会信用体
系建设规划纲要(2014–2020)) [State Council Notice Concerning Issuance of the
Planning Outline for the Establishment of a Social Credit System (2014–2020)],
GUOFA [2014] No. 21, June 27, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201406/27/content_8913.htm [https://perma.cc/UW63-Y4S7] (China).
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institutional authority and effectiveness. As it is stated in OCSCS,
these two are far from meeting the expectations of the general public.
Therefore, it is correct to say that the social credit system is a
regulatory measure.28 Market credit in the financial field is based on
evaluation of economic capabilities and thus provides a basis for the
decision-making of market players. Social credit, by contrast,
especially public credit, aims to confront society’s lack of integrity
by incorporating credibility evaluations of individuals and
organizations into the decision-making process of public agencies.
Of course, this does not mean that there is only one single interest at
play behind the social credit system. In fact, the dynamics among
interests involved are rather complicated.29
3. From Market Credit to Public Credit: A New Starting Point
In order to establish social trust, it is necessary to reduce
uncertainties in communication and asymmetries of information. For
that end, the integrity of both public and private entities, including
the trustworthiness of authorities, is crucial to the establishment of
social trust. Therefore, it is not correct to say China’s social credit
system is a top-down government control mechanism (monitoring
society). It is rather promoting trust within society as a whole. To
that end, the public credit system includes assessments of the
credibility of public institutions themselves, namely governmental
integrity and judicial credibility.
Governmental integrity requires that the principle of integrity
be applied in the operation of public administration. Governmental
integrity above all means policies of a state should be stable and
consistent so that the private parties can reasonably plan their
activities. As a matter of fact, policy instability is considered one of
the biggest sources of risk facing economic and social development
in China. This has long been recognized both in theory and in
practice. 30 As early as 2004, the State Council has recognized
honesty and credibility as the basic requirements for public
28

Baum, supra note 8.
Dai, supra note 17, pt. iv.
30
Li Song, The Problem of Lack of Integrity in China’s Society is
Highlighted, Scholars Say the Primary Responsibility Rests with the Government
(July 25, 2011), http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2011-07-25/105222871856.shtml
[https://perma.cc/5YL8-4E97].
29
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administration according to law (rule of administrative law).31 The
scope of honesty and credibility includes two aspects. The first
concerns information disclosure, namely that the information
disclosed by administrative agencies should be complete, accurate,
and true. This requirement intends to solve the problem of
information disclosure and access during interactions between
private and public parties. The second aspect is to protect the
legitimate expectations of private parties through predictable
application of policies. Without good cause and passing through
proper legal procedure, administrative agencies cannot revoke or
change administrative decisions that have already been in effect; if an
administrative decision needs to be revoked or changed due to
national interests, public interests, or other legal causes, that decision
shall be made according to appropriate legal authority and procedures,
and any property loss thus suffered by a private party shall be
compensated according to law.32 This requirement is to enhance the
stability and predictability of policy and administrative decisionmaking. Ten years later, the OCSCS further expanded the concept of
governmental integrity to include the principle of public
administration according to law itself (rule of administrative law),
with the focus on honoring agreements and keeping service
commitments, such as implementation of economic and social
development aspirations, as well as keeping commitments in
handling affairs of the general public. The integrity of civil servants
is also an integral part of governmental integrity. 33 Although the
central government is working hard to enhance the level of
governmental integrity in all localities, its evaluation obviously
depends on the institutional guarantee of legal liability, political
accountability, and administrative responsibility, and cannot be
evaluated through simple index and points diagrams. 34The various
31
Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa Quanmian Tuijin Yifaxingzheng Shishi
Gangyao de Tongzhi (国务院关于印发全面推进依法行政实施纲要的通
知)[State Council Notice Concerning Issuance of the Outlines of Comprehensive
Promotion of the Implementation of Rule of Law], GUOFA [2004] No. 10.
32
Id. at § III, 5.
33
Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Guihua Gangyao (2014–2020), supra note 1, at
§ II (1).
34
There are various practical efforts to index the level of rule of administrative
law across China. The leading effort at provincial level first introduced by
Shenzhen in 2008, and Guangdong issued a province-wide index system in 2013,
Guangdong Province Rule of Law Based Government Construction Index System
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methods of evaluation of governmental integrity introduced in the
process of building the government under the rule of law are hard to
be satisfactory.
The extent to which judicial judgments can be enforced, upon
which the effectiveness of the judicial system is based, is also an
important guarantee for social trust. With widespread enforcement
deficits, the certainty and predictability of the rights and obligations
of the parties not only cannot guarantee, but also will severely weaken
trust in the system, which in turn will affect the integrity of the parties.
Therefore, judicial credibility is also an important part of the social
credit system in China. In order to resolve the enforcement deficits,
the list of “discredited debtors”35 and joint punishments (see Part II)36
(广东省法治政府建设指标体系), Guangdong Government Order [2013]
No.184. The national-wide effort is Model Index System for Municipality and
County Rule of Law Based Government Construction issued by the Office of the
Central Committee for the Rule of Law (中央全面依法治国委员会办公室)，
Legal Daily, May 24, 2019, page 2. This practice has been based on academic
arguments that rule of law can be first realized in some certain local areas and
reports of rule of law index. See generally ZHONGGUO FAZHI ZHISHU BAOGAO:
YUHANG DE JINGYAN (2007–2011) (中国法治指数报告:余杭的实验 (2007–
2011)) [The Report of China Rule of Law Index: Experiment in Yuhang (2007–
2011)] (Qian Hongdao (钱弘道) ed., China Social Sciences Press, 2012); QIAN
HONGDAO (钱弘道), FAZHI PINGGU DE SHIYAN: YUHANG DE ANLI (法治评估的
实验: 余杭的案例) [Experiment in Evaluation of Rule of Law: The Case of
Yuhang] (Law Press, 2013).
35
In July 2013, the Supreme People’s Court issued the “Several Provisions
on the Publication of List of Discredited Debtors.” A discredited debtor is one
who has the ability but refuses to fulfill the obligations set out in the effective
legal instrument, and has one of the following circumstances: (1) obstructing or
resisting enforcement by means of falsification of evidence, violence, threats, etc.;
(2) avoiding enforcement by false lawsuit, false arbitration, or by concealing or
transferring property; (3) violating the property reporting system; (4) violating the
restrictions on high consumption orders; (5) the debtor refuses to fulfill without
justifiable reasons; (6) others who have the ability but refuse to fulfill the
obligations of the effective legal instrument. However, for those parties who are
actually unable to fulfill, the court will also place them on the list of “discredited
debtors,” and thus restrict them from high consumption. This situation is
obviously different from those who have the ability but refuse to fulfill the
obligations. For the list of discredited debtors, please refer to The Supreme
People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China,
http://shixin.court.gov.cn/index.html [https://perma.cc/5J4D-47KC].
36
Li Fei, Joint Credit Punishment System and Credit Society Construction,
CHINA COURT (June 20, 2018),
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2018/06/id/3362513.shtml
[https://perma.cc/W872-KFZX].
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introduced by courts are important templates for the social credit
system (see Part II for the restrictive measures for those on the list).
Social credit of private entities includes public credit and
market credit. Public credit is established by the public agencies,
with the identity, qualifications, administrative management, and
judicial information of the market entities as the main content, with
classified regulation and joint rewards and punishments as the main
regulatory methods. The essence of public credit is the regulation of
market entities based on credit and the public resources will be
allocated with credit as criteria, the end of which aims to solve the
lack of social integrity.37 The collection of public credit information
is mandatory. In terms of information collection, the government can
collect itself or outsource the service. To the contrary, market credit
is established by various private institutions, including industry
organizations and third-party credit services. The main contents of
market credit are transaction records and credit evaluation
information, which may affect the selection of economic transactions
and the allocation of market resources.38 The collection of market
information requires consent from the market entities. As for current
social credit systems developed in various local areas, the chief focus
is invariably on public credit;39 the market credit system will follow
the provisions of the Regulations on the Administration of Credit
Information (effective as of March 15, 2013) and the responsible
agency at the national level is People’s Bank of China, while the
coordinating agency of the public credit system is the National
Development and Reform Commission.
Market credit is currently regarded as a part of the social
credit system. The media, domestic or foreign, often confuses market
credit with public credit. This has led to very serious
misunderstandings, 40 at least in the very early stages when the

37

Han, supra note 16, at 3.
Id.
39
For example, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Henan, Fujian, Jilin, Liaoning, Shanxi,
Ningxia, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Shandong, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, etc. all passed or
are preparing to pass local regulations or local government rules for public credit
information; Inner Mongolia, Hubei, Hebei, and Guangdong have both public
credit information and market credit information regulations or rules, but public
credit information is the main content.
40
Nadra Nittle, Spend “Frivolously” and be Penalized under China’s New
Social Credit System, VOX (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the38
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outlines of the system were still being shaped. For example, Sesame
Credit, which is widely covered by the Western media and used to
describe China’s social credit system, 41 is a private entity that
investigates and collects the credit information of market entities.
Sesame Credit is one of the eight pilot social credit investigation
entities authorized by the People’s Bank of China in 2015. 42
However, due to many shortcomings, the eight entities, including
Sesame Credit, did not meet the criteria of the central bank and were
not awarded license of social credit business. 43 Market credit
certainly plays an important role in regulating the behavior of market
players. However, given the differences in their content and function,
the main focus of this paper is on public credit, which is also the latest,
if not the most novel development of the social credit system. Of
course, the social credit system is still evolving. Whether the two are
to be integrated and incorporated under one comprehensive social
credit evaluation framework remains to be seen. Given the huge
economic benefits involved, private credit entities do not have strong
incentives to share their own credit data with each other and the
government.44 At least for the moment, it seems that the two types of
goods/2018/11/2/18057450/china-social-credit-score-spend-frivolously-videogames [https://perma.cc/D5TN-E9AN].
41
Zhima Xinyong de Xinyong Weiji: Weishenme Bei Yuetan? Mafan de
Genyuan Shishenme? (芝麻信用的信用危机: 为什么被约谈? 麻烦的根源是什
么?) [The Credit Crisis of Sesame Credit: Why is it Being Interviewed? What is
the Source of Trouble?], SOHU NEWS (Jan. 15, 2018),
http://www.sohu.com/a/216748129_226049 [https://perma.cc/LW9S-ECF8].
42
The People’s Bank of China, Guanyu Zuohao Geren Zhengxin Yewu
Zhunbei Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于做好个人征信业务准备工作的通知)
[Notice on Preparing for Personal Credit Investigation],
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-01/05/content_2800381.htm
[https://perma.cc/S6TV-MGAE].
43
For the remarks of the Director of the Credit Investigation Bureau of the
People’s Bank of China, see Ba Jia Geren Zhengxin Jigou, Jing Meiyou Yijia
Hege? (8 家个人征信机构，竟没有一家合格? ) [None of the Eight Person
Credit Investigation Organizations is in Compliance], SOHU NEWS (Apr. 24,
2017), https://www.sohu.com/a/136098197_673963 [https://perma.cc/YPT8G948]. A license was finally awarded to a newly registered corporation Baihang
Credit (百行征信) in 2018, with those eight pilot entities as stakeholders of the
corporation. BAIHANG CREDIT, https://www.baihangcredit.com/
[https://perma.cc/75HF-LC3P].
44
Jack Ma’s Ant Defies Pressure from Beijing to Share More Customer Data,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/1651bc67-41124ce5-bf7a-d4ad7039e7c7 [https://perma.cc/V3A8-ZURP]; Alibaba and Tencent
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credit will remain essential but separate parts of the overarching
social credit system.

II.

DATA AND REGULATION: THE TWO-LEVEL
STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM

Whether market credit or public credit, the social credit
system itself is a two-level structure aimed at solving problems of
information asymmetry and uncertainty. The first level includes
collection, analysis of credit data, and the result of that analysis,
which is credit evaluation; the second level is a classified regulatory
process based on the credit evaluation, including rewards for good
credit and punishment for bad credit.45 These two levels are the two
focal points of the current social credit engineering. The first step is
maintaining good records and sharing of credit data among different
levels of authorities and agencies at the same level; the second step is
increasing the rewards and punishments based on credit records.46
As mentioned earlier, the first level should be extended one
step backward and one step forward. The step backward would
construct better infrastructure of the social credit system, which
provides technical support for the collection and sharing of credit data,
though this step has its own regulatory implications. The step
forward would change and repair credit evaluation to social credit
grades or ratings. These two steps can be embedded in the structure
of the first level, but they also have a degree of independence, so it is
better to address them separately.

Refuse to Hand Loans Data to Beijing, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/93451b98-da12-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17
[https://perma.cc/U5LJ-W6Y2].
45
Martin Chorzempa et al., China’s Social Credit System: A Mark of
Progress or a Threat to Privacy?, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. 2 (2018).
46
Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Guihua Gangyao (2014–2020), supra note 1,
at §§ parts IV, V.
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Graph 1: Two-Level Structure of Social Credit System

1. Unified Social Credit Platform and Credit Code
Social credit evaluation is a process based on data
accumulation, so the key component is maintaining credit records,
which can later be accessed by public entities and used as a basis or
reference for their decision-making. The scope of and quality of the
data determines the outcome of the process. Therefore, the
engineering of the social credit system requires, first of all, a data
platform that collects, aggregates, and shares credit data. 47 As a
matter of fact, the concept of public credit as a form of social credit
has existed for a long time, but due to administrative barriers, no
effective data collection and sharing mechanisms were established
among agencies at the national level, between central and local
governments, or between the public and private sectors.48 Without
an effective sharing mechanism, feudalism of data and information
islands have formed among different departments, regions, and
47

Chen Xinnian(陈新年), Woguo Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Mianlin de
Wentitiaozhan ji Duice (我国社会信用体系建设面临的问题挑战及对策)
[Challenges Faced by China’s Social Credit System and Countermeasures],
CHINA CREDIT, June, 2017, at 102.
48
Xiong Zhidong(熊治东), Gaige Kaifang yilai Zhongguo Shehui Xinyong
Tixi Jianshe: Chengjiu, Jingyan, Wenti yu Zhanwan (改革开放以来中国社会信
用体系建设：成就、经验、问题与展望) [On the Achievements, Experience,
Problems and Prospect of China’s Social Credit System Construction since the
Reform and Opening-up], 261(10) CREDIT REFERENCE 12, 12–20 (2020).
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sectors.49 Therefore, the objective at the infrastructure level of the
social credit system is to remove those barriers and link the
information islands to each other. This does not mean that, under
previous conditions, there was no data sharing among different actors,
but rather that the development of IT provides more efficient and
convenient methods to facilitate the whole process.
Three notable developments in IT are crucial for the current
social credit system. The first and most important is to establish a
nationwide credit information sharing and publication platform.
Local governments need to set up their own platforms, all of which
are linked to the national platform. The national and all local
governments in China have four basic databases maintained by
different government sectors: register of legal entities, population,
spatial geography, and macroeconomics. In addition, different
government departments maintain their own public information
databases within their respective sectors, such as tax payment,
finance, company registration, traffic violations, etc. 50 The four
platforms combined with supplemental sectoral information
databases are used as the foundation for a unified platform, nationally
and provincially, for the social credit system. At present, the unified
national social credit platform is Credit China.51 To date, the website
has linked 44 agencies of the central government to every province.
Each province has its own homepage for social credit on the Credit
China website. There is a brief introduction of every provincial, subprovincial, and prefecture-level city and comprehensive social credit
index rankings of all the provincial and sub-provincial cities.
Personal and corporate social credit information can be found on the
website. Local social credit data are required to be submitted to this
platform regularly, especially information regarding licensing and
administrative penalties. In addition, central government agencies,
industry associations, and local governments also maintain their own
social credit platforms, like the sectoral social credit systems
49
Liao Yongan & Tan Man, Promoting the Construction of Social Credit
System with Credit Legislation, in GUANGMING DAILY, Feb.19, 2018, at 3.
50
The construction of four basic databases was originally stipulated by
Guidance of the National Informatization Leading Group on the Construction of
E-government in China (国家信息化领导小组关于我国电子政务建设的指导意
见), ZHONGBANFA [2002] No.17, August 5, 2002.
51
CREDITCHINA, https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/ [https://perma.cc/R7JFF3C5].
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established by the People’s Bank of China and the Supreme People’s
Court.52 Some of these platforms are storage-style, collecting and
storing all kinds of social credit information, while others are indexstyle, which do not store the information but have a retrieval function.
Either way, the technical standards and formats of credit information
are important. For that purpose, the National Social Credit
Standardization Technical Committee was established in 2016, and
45 national technical standards were issued by the end of 2018.53 The
National Development and Reform Commission also issued technical
specifications for public credit information sharing.54
Second, in order to determine and cross-reference the identity
of social credit information, the Chinese government assigns all
market players and individuals a unique social credit code. The code
is used as the basis for collecting, referring, sharing, and comparing
the social credit information of every economic organization and
every person. 55 Since October 1, 2015, China has reformed the
regulations of organization registration and implemented a unified
social credit code system. The unified social credit code is divided
into two categories: one is the social credit code identifying the
natural person, which generally refers to the 18-digit citizen ID
number (with the exception that sometimes the last digit is X, which
means 10). 56 This format could be traced back to the second
52

THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA’S CREDIT REFERENCE SERVICE,
https://ipcrs.pbccrc.org.cn/ [https://perma.cc/46P3-AATD]; THE PEOPLE’S
SUPREME COURT’S CREDIT REFERENCE SERVICE, http://zxgk.court.gov.cn/
[https://perma.cc/E9CL-XSQ4].
53
The 2018 Annual Meeting of the National Social Credit Standardization
Technical Committee was Held in Beijing, SOHU NEWS (Nov. 24, 2018),
http://www.sohu.com/a/277573986_777813 [https://perma.cc/2PC5-ZP2V].
54
Guojia Fazhan Gaigewei Bangongting Guanyu Yinfa Shishi Gongong
Xinyong Xinxi Biaozhun Tixi Kuangjia Deng Liuxiang Gongcheng Biaozhun de
Tongzhi (国家发展改革委办公厅关于印发实施《公共信用信息标准体系框
架》等六项工程标准的通知) [Notice of Six Engineering Standards such as the
Standard System Framework of Public Credit Information] (promulgated by
Office of Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm., effective Dec. 6, 2017),
FAGAIBANCAIJIN [2017] No. 1996 (China).
55
Yu-Jie Chen et al., “Rule of Trust”: The Power and Perils of China’s
Social Credit Megaproject, 32 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 10–11 (2018).
56
Guanyu Quanmian Shenhua Gong’an Gaige Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de
Kuangjia Yijian (关于全面深化公安改革若干重大问题的框架意见)
[Framework of Major Issues on Comprehensively Deepening Public Security
Reform]; for the main content of this document, see
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generation of ID cards when the Citizen ID Law took effect in 2004,57
while China began to use citizen ID cards in place of household
registration early in 1986. The other category is the unified social
credit code identifying legal persons and organizations, which is
equivalent to an ID of the organization. The format of the
organization social credit code is also 18 digits, a combination of
numbers and letters.58 The organization will receive a unified social
credit code when registering, while natural persons will receive their
personal identification number after birth registration. Unlike the
social security number in the United States, which is used for more
narrow and private purposes, the Chinese ID is a universal certificate,
which can be used for legal domestic travel and registration
documents.
Third, the real-name registration, although it is not an integral
part of the social credit system, could be used to expand the basis and
scope of social credit data. The wider the application of the real-name
registration, the more easily personal trajectories in economic and
social activities can be monitored and collected. Of course, with
more surveillance cameras, facial recognition technology, and the
national population database linked to real-name registration,
individuals have become transparent in face of public authorities. For
the sake of the social credit system, the Chinese government is further
advancing real-name registration requirements, including for the
Internet, postal services, telecommunications, and financial
accounts.59 Real-name registration originated in the context of train
tickets and financial transactions, but subsequently expanded to
Internet, hotel, and postal services. Combined with information
technology, real-name registration will become an incredbily

http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-02/15/content_2819950.htm
[https://perma.cc/MP95-KLMU].
57
Article 3 of Identity Card Act (2004, amended 2011).
58
Faren he Qita Shehui Zuzhi Tongyi Shehui Xinyong Daima Bianma Guize
(法人和其他组织统一社会信用代码编码规则) [Coding Rule of Unified
Identifier of Social Credit for Legal Persons and Other Organizations] (GB
32100-2015）.
59
Guowuyuan Bangongting Yinfa Guanyu Jiaqiang Geren Chengxin Tixi
Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian (国务院办公厅印发《关于加强个人诚信体系建设
的指导意见》) [The Guidance of Strengthening the Construction of Personal
Integrity System] (promulgated by State Council, effective Dec. 30, 2016),
GUOBANFA [2016] No. 98 (China).
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powerful means of social control. Its chilling effect, such as on online
speech, has caused widespread concerns.
2. Information and Evaluation: The Input and Output of Social
Credit System
The social credit system includes social credit information
(input) and social credit evaluation (output). The former refers to
collection of credit data; the latter refers to the type of credit
evaluation that can be made based on the information collected. In
the current practice of public credit in China, there are two models of
the input and output of the social credit data, which represent the two
extremes of the system. One extreme is the maximum model, that is,
the social credit information input covers every aspects of the credit
subject, and the output is a comprehensive single social credit score
or social credit grade; the other extreme is a minimum social credit
information input, which collects only information of a certain aspect
or field, and the output is a negative evaluation in the event of a
serious infraction that indicates untrustworthiness, which can be
translated into a social credit blacklist.
As far as the social credit information input is concerned, the
general content can be divided into three categories: the first is the
input of traditional credit information, such as tax records, loan
repayment, and utility bills; the second is the input of social
information, including administrative punishment, market or industry
entry prohibition, traffic violations, criminal records, enforcement of
effective legal documents, family planning, academic integrity,
voluntary service, and filial piety; the third is the input of online
information, including interaction with other Internet users, the
reliability of information posted online, and shopping habits.60 The
information input itself should be related to social credit, including
compliance with legal and agreed obligations.
Under the maximum model, all the information in the above
three categories will be collected. The collected information may
even go far beyond integrity to include all information related to
compliance and personal virtues, eventually becoming all-inclusive.
60

Josh Chin & Gillian Wong, China’s New Tool for Social Control: A Credit
Rating for Everything?, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 28, 2016),
https://is.gd/ioOCaO [https://perma.cc/BPK7-8SWJ].
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This would allow the social credit system to become a comprehensive
social control mechanism. The early examples of this maximum
model are the social credit engineering of Jiangsu Suining and
Shandong Rongcheng. Jiangsu Suzhou, which topped all the other
prefecture-level cities in the early of 2018, is also a maximum
model.61 With the development of the social credit system, mutatis
mutandis, more and more cities have adopted this model.
As early as 2009, Suining County of Jiangsu Province passed
the Suining County Mass Credit Information Evaluation Rules and
made detailed provisions on the collection and classification of social
credit information. Each person is given an initial score of 1000
points, which consists of 150 points of commercial service credit
information, including bank loans, credit card use, private lending,
etc.; 120 points of social service credit information, including tax
payment, social insurance payment, etc.; 530 points of social
management credit information, including counterfeit sales, family
virtues, social order, traffic violations, etc.; 200 points of special
social credit information, including civil litigation, administrative
punishment, and criminal punishment. 62 Rongcheng, a template
county-level city in Shandong, has compiled the Social Credit
Information Collection Catalogue, which includes more than 600
economic and social activities, including more than 150 bonus items
and more than 570 deduction items, which will influence the points
of social credit subjects according to their behavior. The scope of
credit information includes not only illegal activities, but also
unethical and uncivilized activities.63 Moreover, according to these
regulations, social credit information includes not only negative
information, but also positive information that can be awarded extra
points, such as obtaining certain honors, participating in volunteer
61

Ding Guofeng, Suzhou Builds a Citizen Credit Evaluation, GUIHUA
SCORES (Aug. 16, 2018),
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/201808/16/content_7619929.htm?node=5955 [https://perma.cc/5D37-8YXD].
62
The Suining Government of Jiangsu Gives Credits to Citizens, and Those
with High Scores Would Be Favored While Those with Low Scores Would Be
Restricted (江苏睢宁政府给公民打分 优者受照顾低级受限制), CCTV.COM
(Mar. 27, 2010), http://news.cntv.cn/china/20100327/101376.shtml
[https://perma.cc/K9SZ-4JH8].
63
Haijuan Zhao,“Rongcheng Model” has Become a New Model for the
Engineering of Social Credit System, CHINA ECON. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018),
http://finance.jrj.com.cn/2018/02/01093024042965.shtml [https://perma.cc/FCZ97UL4].
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services, donating blood, donating money, and standing up against
injustice.
At the other end of the spectrum is a minimum social credit
information model. The data collected under this model can be
qualified by two factors: one is only the serious discredited
information will be collected; the other is only public credit
information in certain areas will be collected. Between the maximum
and minimum models, the middle zone is usually a combination of
the two factors. Namely, the information collected is public credit
information; public credit information across the areas or within one
or certain areas. Another variable is whether the information
collected demonstrates ordinary untrustworthiness or severe
untrustworthiness. Accumulated ordinary untrustworthiness may
become severe untrustworthiness. The current practice of most local
governments in China is somewhere in between, while the agencies
responsible for specific industries only collect credit data within their
respective industries. The stipulation of Shanghai is a leading
example. According to Shanghai Municipal Social Credit Regulation,
the social credit catalogue of untrustworthiness information includes
the following items: (1) failure of payment of taxes, social insurance
premiums, administrative fees, and government funds that are due; (2)
providing false materials, concealing the real facts so as to infringe
the order of social administration and public interests, like submitting
false materials in the application for a license; (3) refusing to
implement effective legal documents; (4) administrative punishments
made according to the ordinary procedures, except for violations of
law that are minor or proactively eliminate or mitigate the harmful
consequences of illegal acts; (5) being prohibited by the regulatory
authorities from entering a particular industry.64 The regulation of
Shanghai has mitigated situations of untrustworthiness. In addition
to the requirement of following the principles of lawfulness, prudence,
and necessity, it also stipulates that unless the laws and regulations
have clear provisions, the other violations cannot be included in the
catalogue of untrustworthiness information. 65 Nonetheless, the
64

Shanghaishi Shehui Xinyong Tiaoli (上海市社会信用条例) [Shanghai
Municipal Social Credit Regulations] (promulgated by Shanghai People’s Cong.,
June 23, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), art. 9 (2017).
65
Shanghaishi Shehui Xinyong Tiaoli (上海市社会信用条例) [Shanghai
Municipal Social Credit Regulations] (promulgated by Shanghai People’s Cong.,
June 23, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), arts. 6, 9 (2017).
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catalogue of untrustworthiness information can become very long
with the development of laws and regulations.
As we can see, the output of the social credit system, namely
credit evaluation, varies with the models of input. The output of the
maximum social credit information model is an all-inclusive,
comprehensive credit profiling, indicated with a specific credit score
or credit grade. For example, the social credit evaluations of Suining
and Rongcheng are both divided into different grades, corresponding
to different levels of integrity. According to the criteria of evaluation
in Suining, grade A is the most trustworthy level, with a score above
970 points; grade B is the general trustworthy level, with a score
between 850 and 969 points; grade C is the warning level for
trustworthiness, with a score between 600-849 points; grade D is the
untrustworthy level, with a score below 599 points. 66 Rongcheng
further divides grade A into three levels of AAA, AA and A
according to the points, creating six grades altogether. Both cities
have adopted a 1000-point score as the benchmark for personal credit
evaluation, and the lowest level of untrustworthiness, grade D, will
be blacklisted.67 The blacklist can be the result of an accumulation
of social discredit data—such as the points below the social credit
threshold, and aggregated ordinary untrustworthiness that has
reached a degree equal to severe untrustworthiness—or it can be the
direct result of one single incident of severe untrustworthy behavior.
On the opposite end as the blacklist is the red list, which includes
individuals and entities that have received high social credit points or
special honors. In contrast, the minimum credit data model mainly
records serious untrustworthiness and ordinary untrustworthiness in
66
Suiningxian Dazhong Xinyong Guanli Banfa (睢宁县大众信用管理办法)
[Suining County Public Credit Management Rule] (promulgated by Suiningxian
Council, effective Jan. 10, 2010); Suiningxian Dazhong Xinyong Xinxi Pinggu
Xize (睢宁县大众信用信息评估细则) [Suining County Public Credit
Information Evaluation Rule] (promulgated by Suiningxian Council, effective
Jan. 10, 2010); see also The Suining Government of Jiangsu Gives Credits to
Citizens, and Those with High Scores Would Be Favored While Those with Low
Scores Would Be Restricted, supra note 62.
67
Rongchengshi Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu Yinfa Rongchengshi Ziranren
Zhengxin Guanli Banfa Deng Sige Zhengxin Guanli Guidingxing Wenjian de
Tongzhi (荣成市人民政府关于印发荣成市自然人征信管理办法等四个征信管
理规范性文件的通知) [Regulation on the Evaluation of Credit Information of
Natural Persons and Social Legal Persons of Rongcheng City] (promulgated by
Rongcheng City Council, effective Jan. 5, 2016), RONGZHENGFA [2016]1, art. 3
(China).
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specific areas, and the credit evaluation is a negative blacklist.68 This
model usually only records severe untrustworthy behaviors in certain
areas, such as the list of “discredited debtors” maintained by the
judiciary and the blacklists published by the regulatory agencies
within their respective jurisdictions. The intermediate model does
not have a comprehensive single rating. Rather, it excludes market
credit information, combines untrustworthiness across different areas,
and the output is a blacklist and a red list. In terms of the three models,
the second one is most commonly found in the practice of a social
credit system. The first model, although more familiar because it
draws inspiration and is based on a scoring system similar to market
credit, is quite different from the latter. The market credit is still a
single-dimension evaluation of economic ability, while the former
attempts to incorporate all dimensions into a comprehensive
evaluation framework.
Though more and more local governments are experimenting
with scoring and grading every citizen and organization, including
public officials, it is still not the universal practice across China.
While it is true that every organization and citizen is assigned a
unique social credit code, it is not true that every one of them receives
a single social credit score or grade. It is also true that, with regard
to market credit, every organization and citizen can be and indeed is
evaluated according to their economic ability and graded and rated,
but it is not true that this is what is happening when it comes to public
credit. When talking about the social credit system in China, it is
important not to confuse market credit with public credit, and not to
equate what is happening in a few local jurisdictions with universal
practice across the country. It is possible that the maximum model
will expand to more jurisdictions, but the more comprehensive the
model is, the more controversial it would be.
3. Publicity and Repair of Social Credit
The evaluation of social credit is dynamic, and the
accumulation of social credit is also a long-term process. Similar to
68

See, e.g., Jiangshusheng Jidongche Jiashiren Wenming Jiaotong Xinyong
Guanli Banfa Shixing (江苏省机动车驾驶人文明交通信用管理办法(试行))
[Jiangsu Province Automobile Drivers Road Civility Credit Regulations
(Tentative)] (2015).
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market credit, the system of public credit includes not only the
provisions of publicity and reference of their own credit of the
subjects, but also dissent and repair provisions. The most important
thing in this respect is that untrustworthy information will not affect
the subject for life, and that there is a valid term for the publication
of credit information.
Under the OCSCS, the Chinese central government requires
that all types of public credit information be displayed for a period of
time, and public credit information that exceeds the time limit will
not be displayed and calculated. The working of this system is quite
different from the market credit system, where information collection
requires the consent of the credit subject and is only displayed
publicly for special references. As far as public credit information is
concerned, it is required to be disclosed in accordance with the
Government Information Disclosure Regulation. At the moment, all
the information about administrative licenses and administrative
penalties is required to be published on the website of Credit China
and is open for public reference. By December 2018, Credit China
had published more than 140 million entries of credit information
about administrative licenses and administrative penalties, of which
administrative license information reached 104.38 million and
administrative penalty information reached 35.88 million. 69 As
expected, these numbers will grow exponentially over time. In
addition, social credit information in key areas, mainly the blacklist
entry, is also published on the website, such as environmental
protection, food safety, finance, energy, government procurement,
poverty alleviation, and public resource transactions.70 The national
and local regulatory agencies of industry and commerce also maintain
a separate enterprise credit information publicity system. The
website publishes social credit information of enterprises and
enterprises must report the required information to agencies

69

National Development and Reform Commission, The National Credit
Information Sharing Platform Has Accumulated 30 Billion Pieces of Various
Credit Information, Dec. 14, 2018, http://m.house.china.com.cn/view/1548027
[https://perma.cc/37X5-YF34].
70
CREDITCHINA, supra note 51.
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according to the regulation. 71 This system is supposed to be a
subsystem of the comprehensive social credit system.
In terms of who can retrieve social credit information, except
for the information made available to the general public, the credit
subject has the right to inquire about his or her social credit.
Administrative agencies and the judiciary may inquire about social
credit to fulfill their legal tasks. The non-public social credit
information of the subject shall not be sought or provided without the
written content of the subject.72 As to the time limit for requesting
social credit information, it varies across the country. The time limit,
for instance, is five years in Shanghai. If the requested information
dates back more than five years, it will not be provided.73 As for the
period of publicity for social credit information and the blacklist, in
Jiangsu province it is seven years for legal persons and five years for
natural persons.74 This means that unless there are special provisions,
the publicity continues even if the reasons have been eliminated, such
as voluntary fulfillment of the obligation imposed by the
administrative penalties. A related question is, even after the inquiry
and publicity periods, the public credit information is not eliminated
but only transferred to the backup database. What role this kind of
social credit information will play in the government’s regulatory
process, whether the public authorities can refer to such information
and to what extent it could be properly taken into consideration, still
needs further clarification.
With regard to how to repair social credit, especially public
credit, those regulations related to public credit also draw on market
credit, set up a dissent mechanism, and stipulate ways of reducing
loss of credit through ex post facto fulfillment of legal obligations,
application for extension, self-interpretation, and fulfillment of the
71

Qiye Xinxi Gongshi Zanxing Tiaoli (企业信息公示暂行条例)
[Temporary Regulation on Enterprise Information Disclosure] (promulgated by
St. Council, Aug. 7, 2014, effective Oct. 1, 2014), [654] GUOFA (2014).
72
Shanghaishi Shehui Xinyong Tiaoli (上海市社会信用条例) [Shanghai
Municipal Social Credit Regulations] (promulgated by Shanghai People’s Cong.,
June 23, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), art. 17 (2017).
73
Shanghaishi Shehui Xinyong Tiaoli (上海市社会信用条例) [Shanghai
Municipal Social Credit Regulations] (promulgated by Shanghai People’s Cong.,
June 23, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), art. 35 (2017).
74
Jiangsusheng Yanzhong Shixin Heimingdan Shehui Gongshi Guanli Banfa
(Shixing)(江苏省严重失信黑名单社会公示管理办法)[Jiangsu Province
Serious Discredited Blacklist Social Publicity Management Measures
(Tentative)], art. 9 (2015).
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contract. Additionally, volunteer service and charity donations help
to repair social credit.75 Because of the dynamics of term limits and
repairs, there is an exit mechanism for the blacklist and red list. It
should be added that the purpose of the dissent mechanism is to
determine whether the social credit information is accurate. When it
comes to whether the blacklisting is legal or justified, the subject
should follow the ordinary procedures of administrative
reconsideration and administrative litigation.
4. Legal Implications of Social Credit Evaluation: Classified
Regulation
At the core of legal implications of social credit evaluation is
a concept of classified regulation. It works similarly to the
classification of restaurants according to the results of sanitary
inspections. Because social credit evaluations may vary from the
maximum model to the minimum model, the results will affect many
aspects of life, ranging from hotels, travel, insurance costs,
government employment, and access to public utilities.76 In the field
of regulatory law, subjects of different credit grades will be treated
differently. In this regard, social credit evaluation functions as a
background investigation, which is similar to market credit. The legal
implications accordingly are different for different grades. The
general inclination is to reward the trustworthy and limit the
untrustworthy across the board.
For subjects with high grades of social credit, the legal
implications are mainly positive incentives, for example, the
enjoyment of red list treatment. This kind of treatment includes a
bonus based on reputation, and recognition and publicity as
trustworthy enterprises, organizations, and individuals on the
government credit website. The red list can use the green channel for
administrative approval, and enjoy the so-called “tolerant acceptance”
of application materials. This means that when major materials of an
application are complete and basic conditions for the application are
met while secondary materials are missing, the application would be
accepted, while it otherwise would not. The regulatory agencies can
75

The Guidance of Strengthening the Construction of Personal Integrity
System, supra note 59.
76
Chin & Wong, supra note 60.
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also reduce the frequency on-site inspections for those factories,
restaurants, and other businesses on the red list and offer them priority
access to government services by reducing the waiting time.
Individuals on the red list can enjoy conveniences and services in the
areas of loans, rent, travel, and tourism.
On the opposite end, for those subjects with lower grades of
social credit, there are four categories of restrictions and punishments
in response to untrustworthiness: 77 the first type is market-based
constraints and punishments, that is, the publicity of
untrustworthiness makes discredited organizations and individuals
restricted in market transactions. Of course, public agencies usually
cannot directly intervene with market activities of private
transactions. But the authorities responsible for the social credit
system often sign agreements with business entities to incorporate
public credit information into their business activities, especially in
the field of e-commerce.78 The second type is industry constraints
and punishments: for those untrustworthy entities that violate
autonomous rules in a specific industry, disciplinary measures such
as warnings, intra-industry communications and criticisms, and
public condemnation would be imposed. The third type is social
constraints and punishments, such as through disclosure and exposure
of untrustworthy behaviors, through remarks, commentaries, critical
reports of the public, etc., and through social moral condemnation,
thus deterring untrustworthy behavior.
The fourth type is
government regulatory constraints and punishments. The two
77

Guowuyuan Guanyu Jianli Wanshan Shouxin Lianhe Jili he Shixin Lianhe
Chengjie Zhidu Jiakuai Tuijin Shehui Chengxin Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian (国务
院关于建立完善守信联合激励和失信联合惩戒制度加快推进社会诚信建设
的指导意见)[The State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Establishing and
Improving the Joint Incentives for Trustworthiness and the Joint Punishment for
Untrustworthiness and Accelerating the Construction of Social Integrity]
(promulgated by St. Council, May 30, 2016, effective June 12, 2016), GUOFA
[2016] No. 33.
78
For example, The National Public Credit Information Center reached
agreement with Pinshang E-Commerce for sharing credit information in May,
2018,
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/xinyongdongtai/buwei/201805/t20180530_11694
6.html [https://perma.cc/67SU-R87P]; the National Public Credit Information
Center also signed credit information sharing agreements with 15 credit service
agencies in May, 2017, https://www.sohu.com/a/138493800_589061
[https://perma.cc/P3EP-3UNY].
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examples of these measures are blacklisting and joint punishments.
Both are the top priorities of the current social credit engineering.
The legal implications of the blacklist in the regulatory
process come in different forms. It may have direct legal effects, or
may influence the reputation of the subjects indirectly through mere
publication, or may be just a factor for the regulatory authorities to
consider. However, these three legal implications often work
together in a single regulatory practice. First, publication of the
blacklist can exert the effects of market and social constraints and
punishments. For the moment, the list of “discredited debtors” in the
area of fulfilling judicial decisions and the list of those deemed as
“severely untrustworthy” in the field of public administration are
publicly released on websites. 79 The disclosure itself has a
shame/blame effect, though the effectiveness may vary among
contexts. Let me further explain this with one typical example. The
blacklist of the court is to condemn parties who have the ability and
means to fulfill their obligations, but avoid doing or refuse to do so.
By the end of November 2018, the courts across China had
blacklisted a total of 12.58 million people who had lost their credits,
accumulatively restricted the purchase of 16.44 million airline tickets,
restricted the purchase of 5.38 million high-speed train tickets, and
3.39 million discredited debtors voluntarily fulfilled their
obligations. 80 Various levels of courts across China have almost
exhausted all means of bringing the pressure of public opinion to bear
on the “discredited debtors,” such as rolling out the names on large
screens in downtown areas, and publishing names on TV and bus
boards. Some courts even customize answering machines on the
discredited debtor’s mobile phones: “The user you dialed has been
identified by the court as a discredited debtor;” and within 20
kilometers of the discredited debtor’s place of residence, the
information about their untrustworthiness will be posted to all phone
users by messaging.81
79

The former could be accessed through http://shixin.court.gov.cn/index.html
[https://perma.ccZJ5X-NZWK]; the latter could be accessed through
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/xinyongfuwu/shixinheimingdan/
[https://perma.cc/7K3M-DMC7].
80
Development and Reform Commission, supra note 69.
81
Nin Boda de Jizhu Shi Laolai, Zhe Neng Pojie Zhixing Nan? Biedoule (您
拨打的机主是老赖，这能破解执行难? 别逗了) [The User You Called is Lao
Lai, Can This Crack the Difficulties of Enforcement? Don’t be Kidding], JIANSHU
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Second, the blacklist can function as a discretionary factor in
government regulation, which is equivalent to background
investigation measures. For this purpose, there are also blacklists that
are not made public, but are maintained by authorities themselves and
are not necessarily shared with other authorities or persons concerned.
Under the social credit system, through information sharing platforms,
the role of blacklisting extends beyond the authorities and industries
that established the blacklist in the first place. For example, in the
process of administrative licensing, those on the blacklist will be
under stricter review, and the summary procedure does not apply in
their cases. In the process of enforcement, the socially discredited
will be subject to more frequent investigations and strengthened onsite inspections. Here, the function of the blacklist is the same as the
watch list. For example, there is a watch list in the field of foreign
currency exchange management. The period of watch is two years
from the time a person first appears on the watch list. During the
watch period, when people on the list engage in foreign currency
exchange, the bank is supposed to review the materials more strictly
than for those not on the list; in addition to showing their valid
identity documents, the people on the list must provide additional
evidence relating to the transaction.82 This watch list thus plays a
warning role in the regulatory process.
Third, blacklisting can also have direct legal effects, and in
this case, it is an integral and dependent part of a specific regulatory
measure. What is legally binding is the regulatory measure, such as
market entry restrictions, airplane and train restrictions, and bids for
public procurement restrictions—not the blacklist itself. For example,
in the case of foreign currency exchange management, on top of the
watch list is a blacklist, and people on the blacklist are prohibited
from currency exchanges for two years. In this way, we can
distinguish the second implication of the blacklist from the third one.
Joint punishments contrast with one-time punishments in one
particular area. The current social credit system intends to increase
(June 14, 2017), https://www.jianshu.com/p/32f486bd0e61
[https://perma.cc/KGJ4-MB6S].
82
Zuo Zhe Sanjianshi Ni Jiangshang Heimingdan, Bei Quxiao Huanhui Zige
(做这 3 件事你将上黑名单，被取消换汇资格) [You Will be Blacklisted for
These 3 Things and will be Disqualified for Currency Exchange], DAFENGHAO
(Mar. 1, 2017), http://wemedia.ifeng.com/6635888/wemedia.shtml
[https://perma.cc/TYT6-CNYY].
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the intensity of punishment towards untrustworthiness by responding
to a breech in one area with broad-based restrictions. The premise of
joint punishments is that information of untrustworthiness could
easily be shared with and accessed by other authorities. Past
information of untrustworthiness will inform future and cross-sector
decision-making, or untrustworthiness in one industry or jurisdiction
may lead to corresponding punishments in other industries and other
jurisdictions. In the event of a joint punishment, when one agency
initiates punishment of an untrustworthy actor, other agencies will
subsequently impose penalties on the untrustworthy in accordance
with legal guidelines. In order to coordinate the joint actions, there
have been efforts to reach joint constraints and punishments
memoranda among different agencies and parties from the public and
private sectors. By the end of 2019, there were around 50 joint
memoranda at the national level. 83 The provincial governments
coordinate the joint punishments within their own jurisdictions
accordingly. With the growing scope and coverage of the joint
memoranda, a person’s untrustworthy behavior in one place will
affect their behavior and treatment across the country.
There are two types of punishments according to these joint
memorandums. One is mandatory, and the other is discretionary.84
The former means that the untrustworthiness will have direct legal
effects in other fields or places, while the latter means that
untrustworthiness will be used only as a reference for decisionmaking in other fields or places. As to the first type, according to
those memoranda, the restrictive and punishment measures include:
85
(1) restrictions on admission to certain industries and access to
83
For the list of the joint memos, see
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/lianhejiangcheng/lingyulianhejiangcheng/
[https://perma.cc/M23H-TEMJ].
84
Guowuyuan guanyu Jianli Wanshan Shouxin Lianhe Jili he Shixin
Lianhechengjie Zhidu Jiankuai Tuijin Shehui Chengxin Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian
(国务院关于建立完善守信联合激励和失信联合惩戒制度
加快推进社会诚信建设的指导意见) [State Council’s Guiding Principles on
Establishing A Comprehensive Credit Incentive and Punishment System], Guofa
[2016] No.33, § IV, para.20, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201606/12/content_5081222.htm [https://perma.cc/N4JY-NLSN].
85
Guanyu Jiakuai Tuijin Shixin Beizhixingren Xinyong Jiandu Jingshi he
Chengjie Jizhi Jianshe de Yijian (关于加快推进失信被执行人信用监督、警示
和惩戒机制建设的意见) [Opinions on Accelerating the Mechanisms of Credit
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government support, including restrictions on the allocation of scarce
public resources, like the chance of obtaining a car license plate; (2)
restrictions on high-expenditure items, including a ban on taking
flights, high-speed trains, staying at luxury hotels, and restricting the
children of the person in question from attending expensive private
schools; (3) restrictions on financing credits in financial securities; (4)
restrictions on obtaining qualifications, and restrictions on
recruitment as civil servants or staff of public institutions; (5) in terms
of social image, restrictions on obtaining honorary titles, and
revocation of honors having been awarded; (6) restrictions on
political rights, such as the person responsible for untrustworthy
production and business units will not be recommended as a
candidate for the people’s congress, among other political roles.

III.

THE NEW BOTTLE OF TECHNOLOGY: ALGORITHM
GOVERNANCE DRIVEN BY SOCIAL CREDIT DATA

From a historical perspective, significant changes seem to
have taken place in the two structures—technical and regulatory—of
the social credit system. Based on the extent of and reasons for
change, it is obvious that the change at the technical level is more
fundamental. The change at the regulatory level, though significant
as well, is mainly due to the changes at technical level. Although
China’s current social credit system has not reached the era of big
data-driven algorithm governance, however, the system itself is
evolving. The Chinese government has a much bigger ambition to
“promote the integration of blockchain technology and artificial
intelligence and establish a new social credit system.”86 At the local
level, there have been pilot programs in the direction of big data and
algorithm governance. 87 This part of the paper will analyze grave
Supervision, Warning, and Punishment for Untrustworthy Persons],
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2016-09/25/content_5111921.htm
[https://perma.cc/XU93-U8XL].
86
Guowuyuan Guanyu Yinfa Xinyidai Rengong Zhineng Fazhan Guihua de
Tongzhi (国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知)[Notice of the
State Council on Printing and Distributing a New Generation of Artificial
Intelligence Development Plan], Guofa [2017] No. 35, promulgated by St. Council,
July 8, 2017, effective July 20, 2017, §§ 3.3.4.
87
The first two provinces are Henan and Guizhou: see Henan Implemented A
Pilot Program of National Social Credit System and Big Data Development,
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problems that arise from data input and evaluation output, especially
in the maximum model.
1. Social Credit Profiling: The Data Foundation of the Social Credit
System
With the rapid development of modern information
technology, it is quite possible that social credit engineering will
establish a social credit profile of all market and social subjects.
Under the aforementioned maximum model of social credit
information, the content of the social credit profile may be allencompassing if market credit information and public credit
information are combined.
For example, the contents of
Rongcheng’s social credit files include: basic information,
administrative regulation, business management, bank loans, industry
evaluation, media evaluation, market feedback, and more. It may
even include information on family morals and social virtues, such as
uncivilized behavior in tourism, filial piety, domestic violence, and
neighborhood disputes. 88 The regulations in Shanghai even stipulate
children’s obligation to visit their parents regularly.89 If children fail
to fulfill this obligation, the information will be collected and

HENAN DAILY (Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/201712/08/content_5245207.htm [https://perma.cc/GRT5-YFFH]
88
Rongchengshi Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu Yinfa Rongchengshi Ziranren
Zhengxin Guanli Banfa Deng Sige Zhengxin Guanli Guidingxing Wenjian de
Tongzhi (荣成市人民政府关于印发荣成市自然人征信管理办法等四个征信管
理规范性文件的通知) [Regulation on the Evaluation of Credit Information of
Natural Persons and Social Legal Persons of Rongcheng City] (promulgated by
Rongcheng City Council, effective Jan. 5, 2016), RONGZHENGFA [2016]1, art. 3
(China).
89
Shanghai Regulation on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the
Elderly(上海市老年人权益保障条例), art. 14 (2016). This article is from
Elderly Rights Protection Act (2012); Ningning Zhu, Let’s Go Home and Visit the
Elder Parents Has Been Accused of Not Being Used for Many Years, CHINA
NEWS (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2017/01-17/8126260.shtml
[https://perma.cc/ZAH2-TMEL].
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classified as discredit. 90 This kind of regulation has become very
controversial since social credit has become all-inclusive.91
Therefore, the first and most important challenge with social
credit profiling is determining what information is relevant to social
credit. The result of unlimited expansion of social credit information
under the maximum model will lead to emergence of a
comprehensive digital profile, instead of a social credit profile. In
that case, the name of the system will deviate from reality. First, the
information collected in the social credit profile should be related to
integrity of the subjects, and not all violations are related to deception
and dishonesty. Because integrity as it pertains to social credit
involves the subjective moral awareness of being honest and keeping
promises, for the purpose of fulfillment of court decisions, those who
are financially capable but refuse to fulfill the obligations are quite
different from those financially incapable of fulfilling the obligations.
It is a pity that the Supreme Court does not distinguish between these
circumstances, but instead labels both parties as discredited debtors.
It is also inappropriate to include traffic violations in social credit
input for the same reason. This is not to say that obeying laws,
including traffic regulations, is not highly valued in society. It only
means that the social credit system should be consistent with its goals
and not deviate from the specific problems it aims to solve.
Second, social credit data in different fields measure different
aspects of a subject’s character and should not be mixed all together.
This is also the problem with the algorithm of social credit. It has
been pointed out that China’s current centralized credit evaluation is
not as good as the market-oriented decentralized credit evaluation.92
90

Waimei Guanzhu Shanghai Xiaoshun Xingui: Bu Tanwang Laoren jiang jin
Xinyong Heimingdan (外媒关注上海“孝顺新规”:不探望老人将进信用黑名单)
[Foreign Press Pays Attention to Shanghai’s New Regulation That Blacklists
People Who Don’t Visit Their Parents], http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/201604/13/c_128890830.htm [https://perma.cc/8HBG-DEF3].
91
Wang Yubin (王珏玢) & Pan Ye (潘晔), Mei Changhuijia Kankan, ye suan
Shixin? Xinyong Chengjie Fanhua (没常回家看看，也算失信？信用惩戒泛化)
[Failiing to Come Home is a Breach of Social Credit? Abuse of Credit
Punishments], HUANGSHENG 9 (2020) .
92
Abigail Deveraux & Linan Peng, Give Us a Little Social Credit: To Design
or to Discover Personal Ratings in the Era of Big Data, CAMBRIDGE J.
INSTITUIONAL ECON., at 381-382 (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-institutionaleconomics/article/give-us-a-little-social-credit-to-design-or-to-discover-personal-

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

2021]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

315

It is true that the latter is richer and more diversified in data, able to
reflect more aspects of the subject, and aligns personal profiling more
effectively and accurately with the goals of credit data collected.93
Market credit and public credit play different roles and weigh
different things. Suppose a person whose traffic violations
accumulate up to six times, the social credit rating of him would be
graded as C or blacklisted, and then the subject would be limited in
many areas, such as application for subsistence allowances and lowinterest loan applications. Even if credit of traffic violations is
deemed relevant to economic status and privileges, it is difficult to
determine to what extent it is relevant and what weight it should be
given.
Third, data input may be inadequate or incomplete related to
under the maximum model. The maximum model outputs a
comprehensive score, which determines the treatment the subject
receives with respect to public services and public administration, so
the data collected for each subject should be consistent and
comparable for each variable. However, even with modern IT
technology, it is difficult to make it a nationwide project to obtain and
track all activity information of each person. Those with less data
might be unevenly influenced by the evaluation and consequently
unduly restricted from access to government services. However, data
are currently in the hands of different sectors: e.g., public credit data
are scattered across the agencies, while social media and online
purchasing data are in the hands of private companies. Although the
social credit system has the ambition of integrating the public and
market credit data, and some joint memoranda exist, since data is gold
in the digital economy era, private companies such as Alibaba,
Tencent, and Didi, have no real incentive to share data with the
government.94
In contrast, the public credit and the minimum model seem
more promising. The public credit data are collected by public
authorities and the output is mainly a negative blacklist, which leads
to only restrictions and punishments intra-and across-industries
instead of holistically different benefits and treatment based on scores
ratings-in-the-era-of-big-data/ABA17A6122E2F353924B813C5AD5B4FE
[https://perma.cc/W5TN-KAVH].
93
Id.
94
See generally supra note 44.
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of the subjects. In general, the more data social credit attempts to
include, the more problems it might create; the more the system is
limited to a particular aspect, the higher the accuracy it would have.
2. Algorithmic Problems of Social Credit Output
If social credit evaluation is based on big data, then it may be
handed over to algorithms to make decisions.95 In the field of social
credit evaluation, algorithms function as a decision-making process,
not a value-free calculation. At present, in the social credit
engineering programs of some cities and the evaluation of market
credit of some private companies, algorithms on the basis of artificial
intelligence and big data have become increasingly common.
Algorithm-based governance has all the problems that have been
addressed frequently, such as opacity and discrimination.96 A databased automated decision-making apparatus will create serious
problems for due process as well.97
Problems of the algorithm-driven decision-making take on
different forms under the social credit system. First, under the
maximum model, data of various aspects have different goals, and
they are in their nature incommensurable. As mentioned earlier, with
regard to public credit, it is hard to measure traffic violations—not to
mention failing to regularly visit aged parents—against the ability to
repay a loan on time. The same problem impedes the repair of social
credit. It is hard to tell how the loss of social credit scores in certain
aspects can be repaired through blood donation and money donation.
As to market credit, many credit investigations rely on the Internet
and big data, but there is transaction information, as well as behavior
information and social information, which is different in nature. The
aforementioned single comprehensive grade may mask the
incommensurability of these different variables. It is morally
arbitrary to assign 30 points to one traffic violation and 40 points to
not visiting aged parents regularly. Of course, the opacity problem
of algorithms can be alleviated by disclosing the calculation method
95

Nizan Geslevich-Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the
Right to be Unnetworked, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 401–408 (2016).
96
Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond
Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLORIDA L. REV. 181, 189–190
(2017).
97
Chen et al., supra note 18, at 32.
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for public credit, but this does not explain the reasons why different
behaviors are assigned certain points. Compared with market credit,
public credit can be trusted to the legislature to decide, which will use
the political process to justify any such provisions.
The second problem regards the discrimination inherent in the
algorithm.98 The data on which the algorithm depends is not neutral.
For example, in the social credit survey of the eight entities
authorized by the People’s Bank of China, the social elite’s credit
score is relatively high, and the credit score of the economically
underprivileged is relatively low, which is also the case in market
credit score.99 Algorithms can also discriminate on the basis of race,
religion, and even gender. At present, the social credit evaluation
based on network data does not include enough data information. So
it is hard to give the subject a complete and comprehensive evaluation.
Another example is the evolution of social credit through donations,
which will result in obvious discrimination between those keen to get
a higher score through donations and those who are not economically
or physically capable of doing so.100 Not to mention, how does the
method of evaluation affect the farm worker and people living in rural
areas? In turn, the more data collected, the more aspects included in
social credit, the more the algorithm requires explanation.
Therefore, under the maximum model of social credit
information, to ensure the fairness and accuracy of the social credit
evaluation, in addition to collecting as much data as possible to ensure
the completeness of the profiling, it is also necessary to specify the
aspects evaluated. In contrast, the algorithm for the minimum model
must only explain how blacklists are generated. This is usually a
98

Bryce Goodman, & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on
Algorithmic Decision-Making and A “Right to Explanation”, in ICML
WORKSHOP ON HUMAN INTERPRETABILITY IN MACHINE LEARNING, Aug. 31,
2016, 3–5.
99
Nittle, supra note 40.
100
For example, the regulation of Rongcheng provides that money donation is
a positive item. Rongcheng Natural Person Credit Reference Rule [荣成市自然人
征信管理办法] (2016); the national policy that blood donation would be
introduce into social credit system became a hot topic in 2019, for this, see
Xiongzhi, Wuchang Xianxue ye ru Zhengxin bie ba Zhengxin Dangcheng
Wanneng de Kuang (无偿献血也入征信，别把征信当成万能的筐) [Counting
Blood Donation as a Form of Social Credit, Social Credit is not the Solution for
All], GUANGMING REVIEW (Nov. 20, 2019), https://news.gmw.cn/201911/20/content_33336333.htm [https://perma.cc/763B-RVFC]
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decision-making process based on administrative procedures.
Compared to the big data driven maximum model, the minimum
model is more transparent and easier to interpret. In practice, what
kinds of untrustworthy information are included in public credit are
prescribed by local regulations, and also to what extent the
accumulated ordinary untrustworthiness would be considered as
severe untrustworthiness. This is not to say the local legislative
process is perfect, but it is still relatively open and accountable. At
the same time, under the minimum model, the standard of blacklist is
rather certain, regardless of the data such as trajectories, probabilities,
and preferences used under the maximum model. The maximum
model output is a clear social credit profile of the subject, while the
result of the minimum model is a negative list.
3. Human Dignity: Social Credit Grades or Blacklist?
If the aforementioned problems with data and algorithms are
overcome, big data-driven algorithms do have the potential to change
law and governance in the future.101 However, even if it can solve
those problems, a single comprehensive social credit score is not
desirable. This is because such a social credit rating, like that in
Suining and Rongcheng, in dividing social credit status into four or
six grades, has the potential to harm fundamental human dignity.
This is only because a comprehensive social credit status is more like
an evaluation of personality, which is inherently subjective and
should be valued accordingly. However, this is not to say that in areas
of market credit, such as evaluating the ability of the subject to repay
loans, or grading market entities according to their economic ability,
is legally or morally unacceptable. It is not the same problem as
public credit because the former is mainly applied with respect to
private transactions. Under the maximum model, the evaluation of
social credit is directly related to the treatment of credit subjects, such
as access to public facilities, even opportunities to public services and
political rights. If the development of the market economy is the
process of liberation from status to contract, then this kind of credit
evaluation that is directly related to the privilege of public facilities
has the potential of reconstructing a “dynamic status.” Even though

101

Dai, supra note 17, at 52–59.
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everyone starts on equal footing before the introduction of a grade,
the grading itself can take a toll on human dignity.
With the development of IT technology, supplemented by
those requirements of real-name registration, and the more
comprehensive collection of subjects’ trajectories and activities on
various platforms, it seems possible to make credit evaluations on the
basis of sufficient and even complete information in the future, so as
to ensure that different groups can be treated fairly. However, even
if this is possible, it is not desirable. This would mean that all aspects
of an individual’s history—not only public credit but also market
credit—would be exposed to the public authorities. The result that
individuals would become transparent before the state brings serious
privacy concerns. This is another way in which human dignity would
be infringed.
In sum, this paper argues that the content of social credit
should be distinguished among different fields. In the market
economy, the evaluation of performance and repayment ability based
on the economic ability of market entities, is of great value for
ensuring the security of economic transactions, reducing transaction
costs, and even determining the interest rate of borrowing. However,
in the arena of public credit, if social credit evaluation is linked to
qualifications of the subjects, and public credit records are used as a
reference factor for public resource allocation and regulatory
measures, there must provide more strong justifications.In this
regard, the positive social credit profiling, which refers to a
comprehensive single social credit score, is not as acceptable as a
negative blacklist, whether at the technical or regulatory level.

IV.

NEW FACES OF OLD REGULATORY WINES: LEGAL
QUESTIONS TO BE SOLVED

It is not uncommon for the government in China to investigate
the background of private parties in the regulatory process, which is
also quite common in the Western countries. 102 In this sense, the
social credit system is in essence a common regulatory apparatus.
However, changes in relevant technologies have brought new
102

Jeremy Baum, Social Credit Overview Podcast, CHINA L. TRANSLATE
(Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/social-credit-overviewpodcast/?lang=en [https://perma.cc/7FMD-526C];
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concerns to the old process of regulation. The first is, compared with
the past, technology-based information sharing and joint punishment
attempt to pursue the goal of regulation by increasing the intensity of
punishment. This begs the question of the normative foundation of
such measures. 103 The second question is, according to the
memoranda of joint punishments, there is an important tendency
toward automated decision-making using modern IT technology.
However, given that blacklisting and joint punishment would
seriously influence the interests of the subjects, how to protect their
interests and rights under the new conditions is a question that must
be addressed.104 The third question asks how successful will a social
credit system be in solving the lack of integrity by increasing the
intensity of punishment. I think this gets to the very heart of the effort
of the social credit engineering.105
1. The Normative Basis of Blacklisting and Punishments
The normative basis of social credit punishment includes both
formal and substantive foundations. With respect to the formal
requirement, the premise of joint punishment is that information can
be effectively shared—and that punishment, whether joint or not,
have a legal basis. According to the principle of legality, any
constraints and punishments should have a legal basis. 106 The main
normative basis of current joint punishments is that they already
existed in various legislation—or the blacklisting is used as the basis
103

See generally Shen kui (沈岿): Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe de Fazhi
ZhiDao (社会信用体系建设的法治之道) [Rule of Law of the Social Credit
System], 5 CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE 25, 25–46 (2019).
104
See Yu-Jie Chen et al., “Rule of Trust”: The Power and Perils of China’s
Social Credit Megaproject, 32 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 31–35 (2018); see generally
Yu Qingsong (虞青松), Suanfa Xingzheng: Shehui Xinyong Tixi Zhili Fanshi jiqi
Fazhihua (算法行政: 社会信用体系治理范式及其法治化) [Algorithmatic
Administration: Social Credit System Governance and its Legality], 35(2) LEGAL
FORUM 36, 36–49 (2020).
105
For a more optimistic view, see Dai Xin, Lijie Shehui Xinyong de
Zhengtixin Shijiao (理解社会信用的整体性视角) [Understanding the Social
Credit System from a Comprehensive Perspective], 6 PEKING UNIV. L. J. 1469–
1491 (2019).
106
For the general discussion of the requirement of legality, see
XINGZHENGFA YU XINGZHENG SUSONGFA XUE (行政法与行政诉讼法学) (Jiang
Ming’an ed., 7th ed., Peking Univ. Press, 2019) 69–72.
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for discretionary considerations in decision-making—which do not
require as strong a legal basis. This is exactly what happens in the
approximately 50 joint punishment memoranda, all of which
specified the basis of joint punishment measures. In this case, joint
punishments do not exceed the framework of existing legislation, at
least on the face. 107 However, in terms of blacklisting and joint
punishments, due to changes in technical conditions—that is, through
information sharing and joint actions by various agencies—the
impact of the social credit system as a regulatory tool on the rights
and interests of subjects is obviously far-reaching. It is not merely a
combination of preexisting regulations. Because of joint actions, the
severity of the punishment for untrustworthy behavior is much
heavier than before. Sometimes the punishment will automatically
apply without any further exercise of discretion. At present, the main
normative basis of China’s social credit joint punishment is found in
the documents and guidelines of the Chinese Communist Party and
the national government. There is no official national legislation.
With changes to the regulatory tools, national legislation is needed to
prescribe the scope of joint actions, applicable conditions, and
punishment, and the degree of social harm should meet the
requirements of the principle of proportionality.108
At the same time, the nationalization of local blacklists and
punishments requires national legislation as well. According to the
provisions of the “Legislation Law,” 109 localities have stipulated
blacklists and joint punishment measures within the scope of their
own jurisdictions. However, the reach of a blacklist’s influence can
quickly expand to the national level. For example, Rongcheng’s
blacklist is required to be transferred not only to the platform of
Weihai, the prefecture-level city with which Rongcheng is affiliated,
but also to the platforms of Shandong and Credit China, the national
107

Most of those memos would include an appendix demonstrating the legal
basis of the regulatory measures and joint punishments, with the implication that
the memo is just restating existing rules. See generally the list of the memos,
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/lianhejiangcheng/lingyulianhejiangcheng/.
108
Shen, supra note 103; Hu Jianmiao (胡建淼), “Heimingdan” Buneng
“Heishang” (“黑名单”不能“黑上”) [“Blacklisting System” Cannot Be
Blacklisted], 1 MINGJIA ZHUANLAN RULE OF LAW COFFEE SHOP (名家专栏 法治
咖啡屋) 85, 85 (2017).
109
The Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by
Standing Comm., Nat’l People’s Cong. Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000,
amended Mar. 18, 2015), CLI.1.26942 (LawinfoChina).
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social credit information platform. This does not mean the
blacklisting of Rongcheng will be accepted by the other authorities
across China automatically. But logically those what happens in
Roncheng would be transparent to all those who have access to the
website. Meanwhile, once the joint punishment action is initiated,
under the conditions of modern technology, its effect will far exceed
the local jurisdiction if and when it is recognized by other
jurisdictions. For example, many places now recognize the list of
discredited subjects beyond their own jurisdictions.110 The question
that will inevitably arise here is that, if a person is blacklisted in
Shandong, should he or she be restricted in Henan or Beijing? This
means that a decision made by a county government may have
nationwide effects. This is a question needs to be addressed by
national legislation, from a national perspective, not by local
governments, from the local perspective.
In terms of the substantive normative basis of joint
punishments, first of all, it should specify those subjects that will be
punished. According to the national government, it is only severe
untrustworthiness that should be punished. 111 Therefore, those
punished can only be the untrustworthy subject, not the relevant
stakeholders, and collateral liabilities cannot be imposed upon those
stakeholders. 112 For example, according to regulations, restricting
the subject of untrustworthiness to enter relevant industries or related
fields, should only be targeted at those responsible, and should not
expanded to the rights of other directors, supervisors, or
stakeholders.113
110
For data sharing among provinces, a recent effort in this direction is Hunan,
https://www.sohu.com/a/409956788_120631680 [https://perma.cc/VNV6-X72U].
111
Guowuyuan Guanyu Jianli Wanshan Shouxin Lianhe Jili he Shixin Lianhe
Chengjie Zhidu Jiakuai Tuijin Shehui Chengxin Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian (国务
院关于建立完善守信联合激励和失信联合惩戒制度加快推进社会诚信建设
的指导意见) [The State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Establishing and
Improving the Joint Incentives for Trustworthiness and the Joint Punishment for
Untrustworthiness and Accelerating the Construction of Social Integrity], GUOFA
[2016] No. 33, promulgated by St. Council, May 30, 2016, effective June 12,
2016, art. 9 (China).
112
Id.
113
The exact scope depends on circumstances. The People’s Supreme court
makes this very clear: Where a unit is listed as untrustworthy, the people's court
shall not include its legal representative, principal responsible person, directly
responsible person affecting the performance of the debt, or actual controller, etc.
on the untrustworthiness list. The People’s Supreme Court, Guanyu zai Zhixing

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

2021]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

323

Second, the content of joint punishment should be
intrinsically relevant to the untrustworthy behaviors. 114 In other
words, the subject can only be jointly punished in fields closely
related to the field in which he or she is not performing well. For
example, for violations related to market regulation, such as
commercial fraud, counterfeiting, and swindling, agencies of market
regulation, price and urban management, and other enforcement
agencies can share the information and implement joint punishment.
However, if the person involved is restricted with respect to personal
consumption, there should be no relevance. Similarly, the
justification for restricting the political rights of social credit subjects
must consider both its normative implications and substantive
relevance.115
2. Due Process and Social Credit Punishment
As mentioned above, within social credit information sharing
and joint punishment systems, there is now a trend towards
technological automation. In practice, the joint punishment agencies
are connected with the national credit information sharing platform:
through the network they automatically capture the blacklist, and the
joint punishment will be embedded in the agency’s management,
approval, and work proceedings, with the purpose of automatic
comparison, automatic interception, automatic supervision and
automatic punishment of those on the blacklist.116 Of course, this is
the convenience carried by developments in technology. However,
Gongzuo Zhong jinyibu Qianghua Shanyi Wenming Zhixing Linian de Yijian(关
于在执行中进一步强化善意文明执行理念的意见), SOHU NEWS (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://www.sohu.com/a/365151076_813375 [https://perma.cc/4DRL-GGT9].
114
Shen, supra note 103, at 39.
115
According to the Legislation Law, the deprivation of political rights should
be prescribed by law passed by the national People’s Congress (Vorbehalt des
Gesetzes). The Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China
(promulgated by Standing Comm., Nat’l People’s Cong. Mar. 15, 2000, effective
July 1, 2000, amended Mar. 18, 2015), CLI.1.26942 art. 9 (LawinfoChina).
116
Article 39 of Management of Credit Reference of Natural Persons in
Rongcheng City provides that the credit evaluation grades required for party and
government management in our city are extracted from the public credit
information database by computer. The evaluation results are automatically
formed according to the relevant credit rating system and updated with the update
of the credit information database.
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blacklisting and joint punishment involve the personal interests of
social credit subjects. In particular, the fully automated evaluation of
personality should be prohibited, and the requirements for human
intervention should be retained whenever there are such requests.117
What’s more, when blacklists are generated and joint
punishments implemented, social credit subjects lack adequate due
process protection and should be provided with minimum procedural
protection through legislation. For instance, social credit subjects
should have access to a hearing. At present, while the blacklist is still
nascent and its role evolving, subjects have not been given sufficient
opportunity to be informed and heard in practice. Even if a subject
disputes a discredit, the agency will continue to publicize his or her
untrustworthiness, or even automatically initiate the process of joint
punishment. The mere appearance of a name on the blacklist will
greatly influence the subject’s reputation and affect his or her other
interests greatly as well. Given the weight of the blacklist, any
subject should be able to contest evaluations and express opinions.
As far as the interests of the subject are concerned, the publication of
blacklists and joint punishment should be considered as an
independent administrative measure, rather than as an outcome of
previous administrative decisions. At the same time, since joint
punishment involves joint actions of multiple agencies, it is
equivalent to multiple administrative decisions. If only the first
agency that proposes joint punishment affords the chance of a hearing
to the subject, it is not enough to provide sufficient protection. There
needs to be a more comprehensive specialized hearing agency to
conduct relevant hearings.
A further question relates to the investigation process. If the
blacklist is automatically converted into joint punishment or
restrictive measures, should other agencies of joint action need to
retain an independent investigation procedure, or should they directly
accept the blacklist and initiate joint punishment? For the joint
punishment, the initiating agency should not only provide a blacklist,
but also clear reasons for blacklisting and for the joint punishment.
The agencies of joint punishment should retain the power to
117
Zha Yunfei (查云飞), Rengong Zhineng Shidai Quanzidong Juti
Xingcheng Xingwei Yanjiu (人工智能时代全自动具体行政行为研究) [Research
on the Full Automation of the Administrative Act in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence], 5 COMP. L. STUD. 167, 175–77 (2018).
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investigate the punishment as they see necessary, considering not
only the blacklist, but also the actions that led to the initial decision
to blacklist.
Finally, there is a question about the dissent and litigation
procedures. According to the current procedures of administrative
reconsideration and litigation, dissent and litigation does not stop the
implementation of administrative actions. This blacklist will remain
public even while complaints are pending before agencies or courts.
Given the influence of the blacklist itself and the triggering of joint
punishment accordingly, the effectiveness of ex post facto relief is not
sufficient to protect the interests of the social credit subject, while the
joint punishment can lead to irreparable damage.
3. Social Integrity through Punishment?
If the price of untrustworthiness is increased through
blacklisting and joint punishment, can the social credit system
improve the integrity of society as a whole? Although progress has
been made, it seems that problems of social integrity are endemic.118
From a cost-benefit perspective, the effect of joint punishment will
still be qualified by other conditions. The first condition is whether
the cost of such joint punishment and incentives can exceed the
benefits from untrustworthiness, thus effectively deterring
misbehavior. The second condition is that the effectiveness of
regulation depends not only on the intensity of law enforcement and
punishment, but also on whether all behaviors of the untrustworthy
are punished, that is, the rate of law enforcement. The answers to
these two questions require further empirical studies, which is not the
concern of this paper.
A much bigger question is that the integrity of society depends
on many factors. For example, the rate of enforcement of judicial
decisions is just one indicator of judicial credibility; whether judicial
decisions are reached in an impartial and objective way may be
equally if not more important. Likewise, the greater constraints on
and punishment of untrustworthiness is obviously only one option to
118

See generally 2017 Nian Zhongguo Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Huigu yu
2018 Nian Zhanwang (2017 年中国社会信用体系建设回顾与 2018 年展望)
[Review of China’s Social Credit System Construction in 2017 and Outlook for
2018], SOHU NEWS (May 4, 2019), https://www.sohu.com/a/311766653_774283
[https://perma.cc/5FHM-ZJM9].
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improve social integrity, but it is not the only option. The Chinese
government is not naive to rely entirely on the social credit system to
improve social integrity, but also includes educating measures and
other incentives into the OCSCS. However, compared to other
institutions in the past, it is clear that blacklist and joint punishment
are the most important innovations under the social credit system.
Even if social integrity is improved due to the social credit system,
such integrity is achieved mainly through coercion, not voluntariness.
This kind of morality through state intervention, 119 if it cannot
somehow be transformed into genuine self-awareness and conscious
action, will eventually become the moral tyranny of power. The
current social credit system aims to solve the problem of lack of
integrity in an anonymous society by means of de-anonymization.
Thus, the real test is when this condition of de-anonymization does
not exist, whether the integrity of the society will still maintain at a
high level. That is not an easy question to answer without further
observation.

V.

CONCLUSION

China’s current social credit engineering is to alleviate, if not
to solve, the serious lack of integrity of society with the recent
development of information technology. The system uses ever more
broad social credit disclosure and sharing (blacklisting) and greater
constraints and incentives (joint rewards and punishments) to solve
the information asymmetry and uncertainties. Though the Chinese
social credit system includes market credit and is trying to combine
the databases of different areas, its major concern is public credit,
together with government integrity and judicial credibility. Even
though public credit and market credit share the same two-level
structure in common, the differences between them are more
important. However, in practice, public credit and market credit are
often confused, which leads to many misunderstandings.
It is true that China’s social credit system has not yet
developed to the extent of scoring and grading each credit subject
nationally, but information technology makes a big data-driven and
119
Rogier Creemers, China’s Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of
Control 5–8 (May 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscipt) (on file with author),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3175792
[https://perma.cc/8UE9-RCDN].
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algorithm-based governance possible. The pilot and model programs
in some localities have been inspired by market credit and followed
such a maximum data collection model, with the output of
comprehensive social credit grades or scores. The data and algorithm
of such a maximum model have their own problems, like relevance,
completeness, commensurability, interpretation, and discrimination.
Besides the impossibility of a maximum model, it is also undesirable
because of various human dignity concerns. On the other end, the
minimum model, though not exempted from problems, seems less
problematic in this regard, with the output of a negative blacklist.
It is technological change that makes the current social credit
system different from those in the past. The related regulatory
function at first does not seem as innovative as perhaps assumed. In
reality, technological changes raise new concerns about the
regulatory function, which need to be addressed before the system
can be well established. Because blacklisting and joint punishment
have a significant influence on the subject and have the potential to
operate across sectors and jurisdictions, there is a great need for
further justification from both a normative and substantive standpoint.
Finally, the increasing automation of blacklisting and joint
punishment makes it essential to give the subject greater due process
protections.
The social credit system, as this paper has argued, is one
possible means to improve social integrity through blacklisting and
joint punishment, but there are a multitude of other factors that may
influence the social integrity as well. As the new social credit system
takes shape, its full effect is still to be observed.
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